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BHATIA,

BALCO

FORWARD,

AND BEYOND: ONE STEP

Two

STEPS BACK?

Prof J. Martin Hunter* and Ranamit Banerjee**
The article charts the development of internationalcommercial arbitration
in India in light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the BALCO
case. It starts by outliningthe relevant parts of the Indian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 and relevant principles. It proceeds to explore the
seminal decision in Bhatia and its after-effects. Next, the article critically
examines the decision in BALCO, and reaches a conclusion as to whether
or not this decision makes India more 'internationalarbitrationfriendly'.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Part I of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter "the Act")
applies "where the place of arbitrationis in India."' The meaning of this provision was
in dispute in the case of Bhatia.2 In its interventionist decision, the Supreme Court of
India held that Part I of the Act could be applied to arbitration disputes with foreign
seats "unless the partiesby agreement express or implied exclude all or any of its provisions."3
On 10 January 2012, a five judge Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to reconsider4 its earlier controversial ruling in Bhatia. On 6
September 2012, the Constitutional Bench issued a judgment in which it restricted
the scope of interference by Indian courts in arbitrations conducted outside the
territorial boundaries of India by excluding applicability of Part I of the Act to
such arbitrations.
THE INDIAN ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT

1996

The Act has four distinct parts. For the purpose of this article, only Parts I
and II are relevant.
Part I applies where the place of arbitration is in India; any award passed
under this part is considered to be a domestic award. §2(2) of Part I of the Act sets
5
out "this Partshall apply where the place of arbitrationis in India".
Part II is concerned with the recognition and enforcement in India of foreign
awards that fall within the scope of the 1958 New York Convention and the 1927
Geneva Convention.
CORE PRINCIPLES
It is necessary to start by setting out some core principles of international
commercial arbitration. These principles and their scope have been at the centre
of the cases that this article explores.

1

§2(2), The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2

Bhatia International v Bulk Trading [2002] 4 SCC 105 [Supreme Court of India].

3

Bhatia International v Bulk Trading [2002] 4 SCC 105 [Supreme Court of India].

4

Civil Appeal 7019/2005 [Hereinafter, "BALCO"].
§2(2) Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.

5
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a)

Lex arbitri:The law governing the existence, powers and duties of the arbitral
tribunal, and the proceedings. Various terms have been used to describe the
expression lex arbitri,including 'curial law' and 'procedural law'. However,
descriptions such as these may cause more confusion than clarification,
because they are not sufficiently precise. The procedure of an arbitration
may be regulated by the laws chosen by the parties; but the procedural law
is that of the place of arbitration.6

b)

Substantive law: The law governing the substantive issues in dispute. This
is also described as' the 'applicable law', 'governing law' and 'proper law of
the contract'.

c)

Law governing the arbitration agreement: In the last century it was often
considered that the arbitration agreement would also be governed by the
substantive law chosen by the parties. However, it has always been possible
for the parties to choose another law to govern the arbitration agreement. In
the 21st century, it has been increasingly fashionable within the international
arbitration community for the arbitration agreement, which is acknowledged
to be autonomous, to be subjected to a distinct set of rules for the purpose of
choosing the law that should govern it.

d)

Law of the 'Seat' (usually described as lex arbitri): The juridical seat of the
arbitration designated by the parties, or by an arbitral institution or, in limited
circumstances, the arbitrators themselves. 9 The seat must be distinguished
from the physical venue of the hearings. The physical venue rarely 0 has
any practical effect on the conduct or outcome of the arbitration. However,
in theory, an arbitration 'governed' by the law of its 'seat', which is usually
(but not always) the law of the jurisdiction in which its hearings (and other
significant events such as 'making' the award) take place.

e)

Party autonomy: This is the guiding principle in determining the procedure
to be followed in an international arbitration. It is generally accepted, and

6

NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN
AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

7
8
9
10

3.50

( 5 th

&

MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN

edn, 2009).

Ibid at [3.07].
Art. 18, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010).
§3, The (English) Arbitration Act 1996.
For example, if the purpose of the visit is to take evidence from witnesses, the arbitral
tribunal should respect any provisions of the local law that govern the taking of
evidence like not permitting arbitrators to take evidence from witnesses on oath.
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the Model Law states that "Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are
free to agree on the procedure to befollowed by the arbitraltribunalin conducting
the proceedings.""

I.

BHATIA INTERNATIONAL

In the earlier years of the 2 1 t century, a three judge bench of the Indian
Supreme Court 12 considered whether it could accede to a request for interim
measures to an Indian court in ICC arbitration with its seat in Paris. One of the
respondents had sought interim relief from the court under Part I of the Act. The
appellant objected that the court had no jurisdiction because Part I did not apply
to arbitrations in which the seat of arbitration is outside India. The issue eventually
reached the Supreme Court.
The bench held that "the provisions of Part I of the Act would also apply to
internationalcommercial arbitrationsseated outside India, unless the partieshad expressly
or impliedly agreed to exclude its application." The rationale was as follows:
*

The Act is based on the Model Law. The provision" analogous to §2(2) of the
Act contains the word 'only'. It was held that the omission of 'only' from §2(2)
of the Act was evidence of intent of the Indian legislature to permit Part I of
the Act to apply to arbitrations that take place outside India.

*

§2(2) of the Act provides that Part I will apply where the place of arbitration
is in India. §2(4) of the Act provides that Part I 'shall apply to every arbitration'.
§2(5) states that it "shall apply to all arbitrationsand to all proceedings relating
thereto." Therefore, it was held that the finding that Part I applies to all
arbitration resolves any apparent inconsistency between these provisions.

*

The court held that parties to an arbitration to which Part II applies would
find themselves without any 'interim relief" 4 remedy in India if Part I was
not made applicable to arbitrations held outside India.

11
12
13
14

Art. 19(1), The Model Law.
Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading [2002] 4 SCC 105 [Supreme Court of Imd ia].
Art. 1 (2) UNCITRAL Model Law 1985.
§9: "A party may, before, or during arbitralproceedingsor at any time after the making of the
arbitralawardbut before it is enforced.. apply to a courtfor an interim measure ofprotection...".
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IT.

CHAOS POST-BHATIA

As a consequence of the Bhatia decision, in Venture Global,15 the courts
intervened in a foreign seated arbitration. The case dealt with an LCIA arbitration
award, with its seat in England. The Supreme Court held that Part I of the Act
applied to such an award, and hence the courts in India would have jurisdiction
to set aside the award. Next, in Indtel, 6 the courts adopted the power to appoint
arbitrators in arbitrations seated outside India pursuant to §11 of the Act.
In an attempt to restore party autonomy, the courts sought to restrict the
application of Part I of the Act to arbitrations seated outside India. The courts
demonstrated a willingness to infer implied exclusions of Part I where parties
had chosen a foreign seat and a foreign law to govern the arbitration. In Videocon
Industries, 7 the courts held that, since the parties had agreed to an arbitration clause
governed by n glishblav, even though thie main contract was governed by [ndian
la\,N they had impliedly excluded Part I of the Act. In Yograjj 8 the Court ruled that
the nomination of a non-Indian seat of arbitration couid also be sufficient to amount
to an exclusion of the Indian courts' supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration.
The international arbitration community took notice of the chaotic situation in
India, because it appeared to blur India's stance on the principle of party autonomy.

The only way around it seemed to be for parties to renegotiate existing arbitration
agreements, expressly excluding the application of Part I of the Act.

III. BHARAT

ALUMINIUM

CO ('BALCO')

In B 1,CO, a two-judge Supreme Court expressed reservatiors about
the decision in I3hatia and referred the matter to a three-judge Supreme Court
that included the Chief Justice of India. The three judge Supreme Court agreed
that Bhatia and Ventu, e Global should be reconsidered by a five-judge bench. The
Court also ivited amici Yriae briefs from leading arbitral institutions operating
in india, including , CIA India and the SIAC.
15

Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computers Services [2008] 4 SCC 190 [Supreme
Court of India].

16

Indtel Technical Service Pvt Ltd v. WS Atkins Plc [2008] 10 SCC 308 [Supreme Court
of India].

17

Videocon Industries Ltd v. Union of India [2011] 6 SCC [Supreme Court of India].

18

Yograj Infrastructure Ltd v. SSang Yong Engineering and Construction Co Ltd [2011]
9 SCC 735 [Supreme Court of India].

19

BALCO.
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(a) §2(2) of the Act, applicability of Part I and exclusion of 'only'
The court held that §2(2) of the Act is a provision clarifying the application
of the law, not an enabling provision (as held in Bhatia). Further, it held that §2(2)
was a legislative declaration of the doctrine of territoriality. Therefore, Part I of the
Act applies only to arbitrations which had their seats in India.
It held that the absence of the word 'only' did not mean that the Indian
legislature intended to make Part I applicable to arbitrations with their seats outside
India. The reason for the omission was explained by the 3 3 0 th Meeting of the drafters
of the Model Law on 19 June 1985 - Article 1(2) of the Model Law contained the
words 'except articles 8,9,35 and 36', and therefore had to insert the word 'only' to
clarify that these provisions would apply also to domestic arbitrations.2"
Enforcement of awards rendered in international commercial arbitration
held outside India would only be subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts
when such an award was sought to be enforced in India in accordance with the
provisions contained in Part II of the Act.
Further, the court held that §2(2) does not conflict with §2(4) or 2(5) of the
Act. §2(5) only means that the Act applies to all arbitrations where it would be
21
otherwise applicable.
(b) No jurisdiction to grant interim measures
The court held that, "if held outside India, interim relief cannot be granted by
Indian courts under §9 or any other provision of the Act as applicability of PartI of the
' 22
Act is limited to arbitrationswhich take place in India.
The court rejected the argument that §9 is a standalone provision. Further,
the court also rejected the argument that parties would be left without a remedy in
such a scenario. The court stated that parties were free to seek appropriate remedies
in their chosen jurisdiction. Though the court recognised that this might lead to
hardship, it noted that statutory interpretation should not be guided by such factors.

20
21
22

BALCO at [63] and [68].
BALCO at [85].
BALCO at [199].
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On a strict interpretation, this result is consistent. However, the courts should
have acted positively and carved out §9 or given the parties an option to opt into it.
While interpreting §2(2), the courts referred to foreign legislation for aid. Similarly,
in this case, the courts could have referred to several jurisdictions, including
England, to conclude that there was legislative intent to allow parties to apply to
the courts for interim relief even where an arbitration has its seat outside India.
Alternatively, the court could have undertaken a purposive interpretation.
The result of the court's finding is that parties with assets in India can dispose of
it while the arbitration is in progress and effectively frustrate its purpose. The
lack of interim relief means that, when dealing with parties with assets in India,
the parties are practically forced to choose India as their seat and to tolerate the
interventionist attitude of the Indian judiciary.
(c) Seat of Arbitration and the Doctrine of Territoriality
The court held that the country where the seat of arbitration is located and
the country whose law is chosen by the parties, do not give concurrent jurisdiction
over the proceedings. It held that only the courts of the country where the seat
of arbitration is located have jurisdiction to address any matter relating to such
arbitration. It is only in the absence of a choice of seat of arbitration that the country
whose law is chosen by the parties has jurisdiction to entertain the matter.23 The
Principle of Territoriality is the governing principle of the Act and accordingly, the
24
seat of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the courts.
(d) Challenging Foreign Awards in India
It was argued that §48(1)(e) of Part II of the Act, analogous to Art V.1(e) of the
New York Convention, indicated that foreign awards could be set aside by courts
under the substantive law of which it was rendered. This argument was based on
the expression 'under the law of which' contained in the section.
Rejecting this argument, the court held that the courts of the place of
arbitration and the law under which the award is made do not have concurrent
jurisdiction. Further, the court held that the 'under the law of which' the award
is made is an alternative only when the court of the place of arbitration does not
have power to set aside an award under its local legislation.
23
24

BALCO at [137] and [148].
BALCO at [167].

Vol. 24(2)

National Law School of India Review2

2013

Moreover, the court clarified that even where the parties are not Indian but
the seat of arbitration in India, the award would be classified as a domestic award.
This is consistent with the position in most countries.
(e) Prospective Application
In an attempt to do 'complete justice', 25 the court held that the judgment
will apply prospectively to arbitration agreements made after 6 September, 2012.
Though this may appear practical, the court could have narrowed the
application of the judgment. Instead of making it prospectively applicable,
the courts could have made it applicable to all arbitration agreements that are
either: (a) existing but not subject to a dispute before any Indian court or (b)
existing and subject to dispute before an Indian court but no final judgment
has been delivered.
This finding dilutes the positive impact of the judgment, in that, it means
parties will need to re-negotiate their arbitration agreements to bring them within
the ambit of the judgment. Unless this is done, the Bhatia principles can potentially
apply to those arbitration agreements.
IV. COMMENT
The BALCO judgment is likely to be well received since Part I of the Act
contains several provisions that (under previous interpretation) allowed judicial
interference by Indian courts in arbitration proceedings, thereby prolonging the
entire process. Especially, §9 (passing interim orders) and 34 (setting aside an
award) of the Act were notorious for being readily invoked by parties attempting
to stall arbitration proceedings by invoking the jurisdiction of the Indian courts.
After Bhatia, parties were more hesitant in dealing with India owing to the
invasive nature of the judiciary. Many parties insisted on terms in agreements to
compensate for this legal risk. This made numerous transactions commercially
unviable. This judgment is expected to equip foreign investors with renewed
confidence. However, the lack of interim relief means that it is still possible for
Indian parties to frustrate such arbitrations. Further, the prospective application of
the judgment means re-negotiating agreements to exclude the potential application
of Bhatia. Thus, though overall this judgment is a step in the right direction, it does
not offer a complete solution.
25

Art. 142(1), Constitution of India, 1950.
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A lot of the published comment on BALCO is focused on the problem of
prospective application of the principles it establishes. However, as stated above,
parties have it in their hands to deal with this by re-negotiating their arbitration
agreements. The more serious problem is the absence of interim relief in arbitrations
with their seats outside.
On a separate note, the question remains as to how the Indian courts will now
treat an arbitration where the parties have chosen the Indian law as the lex arbitri,
26
but located the proceedings in another country. In the Peruvian Insurance case,
the English Court of Appeal considered a contract that provided for an arbitration
to be located in Peru but subject to English procedural law. The Court of Appeal
construed the contract as providing for arbitration in London under English law.
If the Indian courts were to follow the international arbitration community, then
the conclusion would be that the parties chose India as the 'seat' while holding
the physical hearings in another country.
V. CONCLUSION
The main consequence of this judgment will be to insulate arbitrations seated
outside India from unwelcome interference by the Indian courts. The decision
takes a step forward in clarifying the mutual exclusivity of Parts I and II of the Act,
concluding that Part I of the Act is not applicable to international arbitrations held
outside India. However, the judgment leaves such parties without the possibility
of obtaining interim relief in India.
India has taken a significant step in the right direction in the international
arbitration context. However, the absence of any provision to obtain interim relief
under Part II of the Act means that there is still some way to go before India creates
an international arbitration regime that is in full accordance with international
norms.

26

Naviera Amazonia Peruana SA v. Compania Internacional de Seguros de Peru, [1988]
1 Lloyd's Rep 116.

